Introduction

The international community is coming of age.

It has graduated from a divergent group of agenda-driven actors into a community of practice and is now attempting to adopt comprehensive norms, standards, and codes that will see it through to the next stage of evolution: a common tradespace. The international community's ability to contribute to tenable global peace depends on an ability to work within this space – to do the *right* things, at the *right* times, in the *right* ways, using the *right* means – and to accurately assess collective progress and success.

The doctrine of the international community offers guidance for comprehensive norms, standards, and codes that will transform interests, values, services, and products into a common *tradespace*. The notion of a tradespace is a collocation of the terms *trade-off* and *play space* and is a framework for analyzing the complex resources, costs, and provisioning involved in very large projects with multiple stakeholders, objectives, and interdependent variables. Trade-offs are an exchange of one thing in return for another, especially the relinquishment of one benefit or advantage for another considered to be equally or more desirable; play space is the area bounded by the functionality and purpose of those stakeholders involved in that space.

Tradespaces are multi-variant interdependent spaces recognized for a collection of processes that span multiple sectors in which stakeholders each have their own core objectives. The concept is aptly suited to peace operations and civilian crisis management because these activities require *inter*-stakeholder processes to reach an equilibrium state that is stable, resilient, and maximizes effectiveness, progress, and success for

principal stakeholders, including members of war-affected publics. Understanding operations through the lens of a tradespace makes research difficult, as traditional research calls for a sectioning-off of processes and phenomena within a space. This is counter-intuitive to the interrelated nature of the tradespace being researched.[1]

Deciding upon right things and accurately assessing our collective and cumulative success may be yet a long way off. Deep ontological divides exist between the sectors of peace operations and civilian crisis management. There is little agreement as to what projects, aims, objectives, and outcomes make up peace operations and civilian crisis management. Peace operations for the United Nations are different from the European Union's remit for civilian crisis management, and coalition activities in Iraq do not fall under the rubric of peace operations. Yet the sectors that conduct peace operations and civilian crisis management are similar – even shared. It could be assumed, falsely, that the sectors involved in peace operations and multinational civilian crisis management activities have common ontology; the ontological divide between the sectors, however, is great. As the international community shapes its own tradespace, there is no illusion that the sectors of military, security, governmental, humanitarian, police, and private sectors will adopt similar ontologies or worldviews to inform their collective crisis interventions. The so-called 3D approach (development, diplomacy, and defence) representative of the whole of government of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian organizations and civilian police is aptly described as "boots, suits, sandals, and badges" (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
Boots, Suits, Sandals, and Badges



Understanding ontological divides will be a requirement within the new tradespace. Dana Eyre, former senior advisor for USAID in Iraq, suggests: "Unity of understanding is more important than trying for unity of command in the complex tradespace of peace operations and civilian crisis management."[2] The challenge, however, is that success must first be measured and assessed in order to inform decisions regarding the *right* things, at the *right* times, in the *right* ways, using the *right* means. Herein lies the rub. How exactly do we define success? If we define it differently, is there any opportunity to agree on success within the common tradespace? Answering these questions may be dependent upon identifying what our goals and objectives are in peace operations, and what stakeholder strategies exist for achieving them.

Evolution towards this point has been marked. Stakeholders involved in international peace operations and civilian crisis management – namely, defence and security, civilian police, humanitarian organizations, international organizations, governments, host nations, and the private sector – have matured their structures, praxis, policies, guidance, and accountability, leading towards effectiveness with the broadly shared intention (albeit unconscious) to eventually enhance the *comprehensive* efficacy of peace and security management within a shared operational space. International multi-lateral interventions are increasingly integrated and multi-functional, encouraging stakeholders in various sectors to provide services across sectors through many tasks and activities within the spectrum of operations, including security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.

Along with the development of these public services contributing to the global common goals of peace and security has come the privatization of these services. The coupling of the private and public sectors in these social capital endeavours has produced a robust *peace economy*.[3]

The shared operational space is overlaid with the spectrum of operations – typically perceived as a linear model by the international community – and is divided into three dominant areas of activity:

1. *Intervention,* characterized by suspension of hostilities; stabilization agenda; non-permissive environment
2. *Peace Operations and Civilian Crisis Management*, characterized by transitional operations; cessation of armed conflict; reconstruction and short-term quick impact agenda; quasi-permissive environment
3. *Peacebuilding and Development*, characterized by consolidation operations; sustainable peace and prosperity agenda; permissive environment

The spectrum of operations (Figure 2) informs the international systems of intervention, yet it does not support thinking about intervention as a common tradespace in which this collective community seeks to stabilize security and formulate tenable peace and accurately assess progress and success. The complexity of our security environment requires a new, sophisticated analysis of the efficacy of intervention programs.

The key question is how we are to measure the success of integrated, multi-functional international operations. This type of question forces clarification of the purpose, aim, and objectives of peace operations and civilian crisis management. Perhaps as in most scientific endeavours, peace operations and civilian crisis management cannot be defined until it is determined how they will be measured. Measures of success, therefore, clarify the purpose, aim, and objectives of international interventions. Unless we determine what success looks like at the beginning – for the international community and the members of the public – we cannot determine the scope and definition of peace operations and civilian crisis management.[4] Measurement comes first. Yet such scientific rational processes are linear imaginings, and it is not clearly understood how they can be applied to measuring significant changes in people affected by conflict and calamity.

FIGURE 2
The Spectrum of Operations



The success of peace operations is relatively easy to determine at the macro level.[5] Lives are being saved, or they are not. Stability is either present, or it is not. And the operation is either facilitating democratic transformation, or it is not. However, perceiving operational success as black and white progress towards peace and stability seems overly simplistic, especially in the global security environment – categorized by most theorists and practitioners as incalculably complex.

The *human condition* is virtually impossible to measure. Typically referred to in humanitarian and development literature as *human development and well-being*, in this context the human condition is the state of socially constructed influences construed from cultural, physical, economic, spiritual/religious, psychological, ideological, and political elements. These elements inform our lives and the way we relate to our contexts, and determine with which contexts we have a reflexive relationship. According to an anonymous United Nations program officer, "We don't know what [success] looks like. We can't agree on what it means. And the metrics of success are all different in each mission and sector."[6] When attempting to measure the human condition – whether it is worsening or improving – are there metrics that capture such change?

Some would argue yes, while others would say that metrics are numbers and scores, which by nature do not adequately address attitudinal, behavioural, or societal change – in other words, the postwar human condition. Militaries are ill-equipped to measure the human condition, and change cannot be attributed to Newtonian cause and effect linear dynamics. Said one interview participant involved in this study, "Militaries are very able to conduct internal audits of performance, yet our available systems are ill-equipped to audit change in war-affected members of the public. There are other ways to measure the human condition, and these are generated from the policing, humanitarian, and development sectors, because these sectors are the interface with local populations." As Eugene Bonventre, a colonel in the US Air Force, argues: "That such measurements will never be perfect and causal relationships will never be definitively proven should not preclude attempts to develop practical assessment techniques."[7] All measuring systems have innate technical limitations, which explains in part the difficulty in reaching a consensus on verification methodologies among the sectors of peace operations and civilian crisis management.[8]

Yet when it comes to international interventions, we are able to identify what *does not work* much more easily than *what does work*. The media seems to have a particular capacity in this regard. So too do war-affected citizens, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who can clearly articulate

the dismal failures of the international community in their own backyard but have difficulty describing successes.

Worrisome for watchdogs, no standard fiscal reporting mechanism or performance measurement mechanism exists that can track obligations and expenditures of national intervention activities in places like Iraq, Bosnia, and Haiti. There remains no way to assess real costs, only targeted expenditures, no way to assess real-time progress, only targeted goals. The lack of field-reporting capacities and capabilities and of performance management systems makes it impossible to accurately portray the status of each sector, the overall assistance efforts, or the effectiveness of those efforts in peace operations and civilian crisis management. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, peace operations and civilian crisis management theory and practice have advanced considerably over the last few years, yet the international community still lacks progressive, pragmatic, cost-efficient, and reliable models for measuring the success of their activities in conflict-affected environments.[9] Britain's Department for International Development unequivocally states that current systems for assessing project performance offer no way of identifying success in moving towards post-conflict goals.[10] A system is required that shows the connections between mandates, goals, and activities; that reflects more rigorous thought processes; that illustrates that planners have explicitly considered conflict dynamics and the potential positive and negative impacts of intervention activities in conflict environments.

The RAND Corporation, an American think tank, suggests that even though many peace operations and civilian crisis management activities involve several of the same stakeholders, it is difficult to find consistent and comprehensive data on all but the dominant activities, such as reconciliation or national army training projects. Most data sets are incompatible and do not lend themselves to comparative analyses across sectors, nor do they accurately assess progress in the majority of activities in post-conflict environments. Attempts to quantify outcomes of complex processes fail because of the unavailability of precise statistical measures; limited data sets, if they are attainable at all, inhibit firm conclusions of progress. According to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), the quality of measuring systems remains underdeveloped and calls for a more sophisticated, high-quality process in order to have a lasting positive effect on improving learning, accountability, and performance in sectors involved in civilian crisis management.[11]

Other strategists argue that there are no meaningful metrics for measuring progress, and fewer meaningful government reports on progress in Iraq

and Afghanistan.[12] Governments continue to use outdated methods for reporting results, publishing progress reports "long on noble rhetoric and short on useful content."[13] This reality is reflected in the deficiencies of the results-based measuring frameworks – employed by many governments – which prevent moving beyond monitoring activities to measuring the significance of the impact of such activities.[14] In the absence of metrics, maps, and useful analyses, there is undue reliance on a preponderance of positive anecdotes from the field to further justify interventions. When realistic evaluation is employed, the results are often non-transferrable. For example, specific activity-level improvements at the micro level do not necessarily transfer to macro successes. Their specificity in scope, scale, and localized approach cannot suggest what is occurring overall. The opposite also holds: macro successes cannot be transferred as local successes. There are no absolute measures of whether intervention operations, programs, and activities have worked.[15]

Challenges to the Tradespace

Incompatibilities between sectors and stakeholders, such as funding, worldviews, values, and mandates, impede flexibility, adaptability, survivability, scalability, modifiability, and robustness within the common tradespace. Most of the literature on peace operations and civilian crisis management suggests that three major sectors are involved in intervention: development, diplomacy, and defence. There are other sectors, of course, including policing, humanitarianism, government, private industry, finance, and academia. Each can be further unpacked to expose heterogeneous – not homogenous – sectoral stakeholders, motivated by sophisticated worldviews that inform their interventions. For example, the humanitarian aid and assistance sector alone can be subdivided into a mosaic of powerful actors informed by a religious agenda (Islam, Judaism, Christian), small and good-hearted organizations (Clowns without Borders), and the morally concerned (Amnesty International, Oxfam, CARE, Mercy Corps), among many other agendas and perspectives on humanitarianism. Each sector embodies intervention at different scales and levels, nationally and internationally, and each must contend with being painted by the same brush as those with which it shares a perceived sector. Outsiders think that other sectors are homogenous; this is not the reality.

Although rarely considered as stakeholders by the others, the host nation and its various publics, also motivated by unique *weltanschauungen*, are gravitational forces in the forward progress of intervention activities. And, as in the example above regarding the myth of homogeneity within the humanitarian sector, others too see the host nation and its population as a homogenous entity.

Enormous funding disparities exist between the development of organizations such as NATO and the rest of the stakeholders of peace operations and civilian crisis management. With trillions of dollars spent in the last fifty years on improving the systems of command, control, communication, coordination, and information technology, it is not surprising that other sectors have fallen behind the defence sector in terms of planning and measuring progress. Militaries' ability to measure success is for the most part far superior precisely because of the funds spent on development and multinational experimentation. In fact, funds spent, in theory, put western militaries at a superior advantage when compared to other stakeholders such as civilian police or international organizations like the ICRC, even though all are members of the international community of stakeholders involved in managing crises. Yet despite the time and funds invested, western militaries with their planning systems and metrics are no more able to accurately measure progress in peace operations and civilian crisis management than national development agencies such as DFID, USAID, and CIDA, or international organizations like the ICRC and ALNAP.

Understanding the values, principles, and theories that inform standards and mechanisms for measuring what matters is a keystone of the common tradespace. Fundamentally, if we understand what drives us to do our work and to measure that work, then we can better comprehend the dynamics of the complex environment instead of being victim to it. It is difficult, however, to change our perspectives regarding what we do and how we measure our successes. Our perspectives are laden with values, principles, and our individual and organizational identities.

According to Ralph Keeney, an American expert on value-focused thinking, values are what we care about. He suggests that value-focused thinking is critical in situations where there are real, important, and complex decisions to be made with no clear solution at hand.[16] This implies that the examination of stakeholder values can inform the process of measuring. On the other hand, militaries are concerned with measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which they understand as what is *wanted* rather than what must be done or what needs to be achieved. Steve Flemming, a defence scientist with Canada's Department of National Defence, observes that "the planners who typically produce initial MOE programs are engineers, and they tend to start at the wrong end – with what *can* be measured, rather than what *should* be measured."[17] Flemming goes on to say that the defence sector thinks that by measuring effectively they are actually making the change they are measuring.

Perhaps a part of the challenge is that some of the sectors involved in peace operations and civilian crisis management are seen as having lofty

goals and vague mandates[18] rather than mandate-specific operational goals such as in the security and defence sectors. Not-for-profits, non-governmental organizations in the humanitarian and development sectors, and even the police sector get poor marks from military planners who see their own work as logical and rational, and that of other sectors (with whom they are now sharing the operational space) as soft, flaky, and loosey-goosey in terms of the ability to measure success. Not surprisingly, humanitarian and development NGOs see their military colleagues as "group-thinking Neanderthals"[19] with no ability to consider the qualitative aspects of intervention. Yet ALNAP's founder, John Borton, argues that humanitarians themselves have taken a long time to adopt a client-centric approach to their interventions, and by default, their performance measuring, whereas the military field of civil-military co-operation has advanced its client-centric approach nearly to the levels of psychological operations (e.g., winning "hearts and minds" campaigns). Militaries involved in peace operations and civilian crisis management (vis-à-vis combat operations and counter-insurgency efforts) have adopted military planning methods in their reconstruction and stability operations, which demand that measures of success are determined before campaign activities begin. James Embrey, the General Pershing Chair of Military Planning and Operations at the US Army War College, suggests that it "just makes sense that you do this thinking before you start the campaign, because it causes you to question, 'Should I do X if I can't know if it's making a difference?' as well as 'When higher-ups [headquarters] (and Congress) ask how we're doing on the path to victory, how do I answer their question (without winging it)?'"[20]

For western militaries, measures are outcome based (measuring effectiveness in changing conditions toward the desired conditions) as well as internal efforts based (measuring performance). Measuring effectiveness, progress, and success in combat operations is best done using military planning methods, as they are the most able to connect measures with mandates in order to achieve strategic intent and overall goal achievement. However, in peace operations and civilian crisis management, unlike in combat operations, it is the human condition that is being measured. Achieving intended effects, whether for increased security or for democratic governance, is the reason that intervention activities are undertaken.

As sector constituencies – the donors whom stakeholders report to – become more aware of the constraints within war-affected environments, their interest in success increases. As members of war-affected publics become principals in approaches to peace operations, their involvement in measuring what matters requires empowerment and encouragement.

All sectors need to measure intervention activities to identify gaps in effectiveness according to the principals involved – including citizens, donors, and the global commons.[21] The quality and consistency of evaluations and audits appear to be directly related to the level at which an organization is held to account by its constituencies, such as donors, governments, and citizens. In other words, attempts to verify success are completed only if and when an organization is held accountable for its actions, has incentives for measuring, or is a learning organization that values lessons and practices to improve future intervention activities. And of course, if there are resources, materiel, and staff specifically dedicated to conducting measuring, reporting, and evaluation, there is a higher likelihood of those activities being completed as a part of an intervention itself.

Moreover, sectors' objectives are different, which affects intervention outcomes. Although they intend different outcomes with their intervention activities, the ways in which success is measured along the way could be a rallying point for clashes of intervention titans. Many NGOs fall into the category of non-profits, being known to track their performance using over-simplistic performance metrics related to their mission, such as funds raised, tonnes of food distributed, number of immunizations administered, number of refugees repatriated, number of police and judges trained. But, as John Sawhill and David Williamson argue, these metrics do not measure the real success of an organization in achieving its mission.[22] There are few, if any, adequate methods to measure the achievement of organizational or program objectives, because of their sweeping, broad nature. Sawhill and Williamson offer an excellent example to illustrate their point: CARE USA's mandate is "to affirm the dignity and worth of individuals and families living in some of the world's poorest communities." And in the authors' words, "Try to measure that!"

From an outside-looking-in perspective, the major stakeholders involved in peace operations and civilian crisis management tend towards similar approaches to intervention activities and measuring the success of such activities. However, the values informing their approaches are distinctly different, even divergent. Militaries focus on end states rather than interim processes, while humanitarians focus on continual and consistent beneficiary access rather than exit strategies. Civilian police, under UN auspices, approach their work through a mentoring-training or crime-reduction lens, while most private sector actors are focused on efficiency towards profitability. Military personnel tend to see humanitarians as hostages of fortune, forever perpetuating their business and seeking the next crisis to assuage, while humanitarian non-governmental organizations tend to perceive private security companies as mercenaries, and see uniformed military personnel as to be avoided at all costs.

There are two dominant modalities for measuring success. The first measures outcomes and is fixed upon goal attainment and achieving end states. The second measures process and focuses on ways to shape the environment so that intervention activities can lead to goal achievement. It would be over-simplification to suggest that the military and defence sectors focus on the former while the humanitarians and development field focus on the latter, but this is not always the case. The security perspective does have a predilection for finding better, more meaningful metrics to measure progress in non-traditional state-building environments in which militaries find themselves at work. The prevalence of the combat-centric perspective wanting better, clearer, more meaningful metrics for peace operations and civilian crisis management is a hangover from traditional war fighting, and this method is not applicable to state-building activities. Metrics are useful in combat: numbers count, because numbers save lives. Such metrics are far less meaningful in complex operations, yet the quest for the holy grail of metrics continues.

Establishing the right metrics and indicators as measures of success, or building the capacity to conduct measurement, is tied to the values, principles, assumptions, and philosophies of intervention. The RAND Corporation and others suggest that establishing performance metrics is vital so that policy-makers can objectively assess success and failure during nation-building missions and make mid-course corrections if necessary.[23] The US Government Accountability Office, on the other hand, recommends that a performance management system be designed to better assess progress toward achieving goals and to provide a basis for planning future reconstruction.[24] Some argue that stakeholders involved in complex operations would benefit from using the same system to more completely communicate performance information to decision-makers in home governments and, eventually, tax-paying constituencies.

Although stakeholders of peace operations and civilian crisis management have developed progress reporting frameworks based upon metrics and indicators, these tend either to measure internal project progress – almost like an audit – or more vaguely, to measure external progress according to the perceived impact of a project. Hindsight is always 20/20, and most evaluations – including lessons learned and best practices – come *after* the completion of an intervention activity. This highly biased process can turn a blind eye to failures while spin-doctoring successes. Lessons learned and best practices are not a measurement system and may not capture the impact of interventions on people. Available measuring frameworks are not compatible between stakeholders and sectors, and range in utility, purpose, and application, resulting in less than comprehensive determinations of success in peace operations and civilian crisis management. Success is cumulative. It is achieved not by

reaching one's pre-determined targets but through a cumulative process of successes.

The Complex Environment

We live in uncertain times. And uncertain times lead to constant change in our systems, policies, and processes. Our ever-changing security environment – which some refer to as complex – is causing the international community to think and act differently. One swift Google search illustrates this point perfectly. Articles on international relations, and more specifically security and defence, refer to the ever-changing and dynamic *complex* security environment. With most media messages, we read that life in the twenty-first century will be characterized by complexity, instability, and change, as well as globalization, dynamicism, and evolution. If constant change is the future, how then is success to be measured in a context of change?

The hallmark of measuring anything is stability. A stable system can be measured; a constant application of policy can be measured; a consistent approach can be measured. Science has shown that stability is the key to repeating any type of experiment or process. From a scientific perspective, an environment of instability creates different results every time. Instability means that variables are introduced and removed throughout a process. In an unstable environment, measuring is not verifiable. In a crisis environment there are few if any constant variables, and our ability to conduct multi-variant analyses is limited at best, especially when the evolving human condition is part of the environment being analyzed. If the benchmarks against which intervention activities are compared or measured become outdated because of the multi-variant environment, what hope do we collectively have of measuring our success to verify the efficacy of interventions? This suggests that failure to measure success occurs with a rapid rate of change. Correctly measuring success may forever suffer because of the attempt to catch up to reality.

Some see this period in our history as an opportunity to respond innovatively to constant change. If this period is considered as an opportunity rather than a constraint, then there are opportunities to adjust the ways in which success is measured in places like Afghanistan, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These adjustments may even have application on a national scale, where change seems to occur less quickly than in the international arena. Perhaps our collective hand is forced to progress our thinking beyond linear dynamics – simple cause and effect equations – towards non-linear approaches that better reflect the reality of the complex environment.

At the same time that the peace and security environment is in flux, so too the transformation from industrial age thinking and systems continues towards information-age thinking and systems. This transformational opportunity also serves as a process for shrugging off the constraining systems, policies, and processes of outdated modalities designed for a prior age dependent upon Newtonian cause and effect mechanics.

In such an environment of change and so-called complexity, there may be little room for standards and mechanisms that worked well with yesterday's reality but have less relevance and utility in today's environments. What, then, can stabilize the application of our processes regarding international intervention activities in an environment known for its fluctuations, inconsistencies, and absence of rules-based relationships?

The positive news is that measuring success in general has become more deeply ingrained in some sectors, in particular the humanitarian sector. It is probable, as many of the participants interviewed for this research project have forecast, that as more data is developed, considered, and shared across sectors, there will be a convergence around optimal comprehensive verification methods of activities related to peace operations and civilian crisis management.

Conceptual Clarifications

Some conceptual clarifications should be made at the outset of this discussion.

1. Despite significant forward progress in the field of evaluation related to cause and effect relationships and the correlation of program success to linear-dynamic relationships, these lessons have not fully been transferred to peace operations and crisis management assessment and measuring. Although third-party evaluators, who have benefited from significant progress in their field, conduct formal evaluations of bilateral intervention programs in conflict-affected regions, the broadly defined indicators of success for peace operations and crisis management limit the utility of cause and effect correlation for measuring success, progress, and effectiveness. The indicators used to measure progress in state building, governance, and well-being are not clear and may not be transferable to other contexts. This lack of clarity is an impediment to fully adopting the progress related to cause and effect attribution in the field of evaluation.

2. Although there are limitations to cause and effect measuring, the intellectual conceptualization of linking intervention inputs (our activities) with outputs and outcomes is a useful exercise.

Understanding at some level that there are linkages – albeit remote, in some respects – between our activities and sustainable peace may cause interventionists to be more critical about the unintended consequences of intervention activities in conflict-affected environments.

3. When thinking about policy, it is important to consider *change* in relation to *resources* and *political will*. Change related to peace operations and crisis management occurs in relation to these two other factors.

This book is about tradespace stakeholders' worldviews, practitioners' views of modalities of measuring intervention activities, available mechanisms and tools suitable to measuring progress in a tradespace framework, and policy options to inform comprehensive progress in peace operations and crisis management. The goals of this book are fourfold.

First, it undertakes to highlight stakeholder worldviews to increase understanding and improve synergies among those that share the international intervention tradespace. How we measure our activities drives how we do our activities. This book presents the argument that the principals involved could benefit from a deeper understanding of the theories, concepts, philosophies, and assumptions of the other stakeholders with whom they share space in the peace operations and civilian crisis management environment.

Second, this book examines the modalities of measuring success through the lens of the agents who plan, implement, and live with the results of peace operations and civilian crisis management.

Third, it provides an overview of the mechanisms and tools for measuring effectiveness, progress, and success within the tradespace. Various linear cause-and-effect mechanisms are presented – results-based management, measures of effectiveness, LogFrames, essential task matrices – which attempt to reduce complex intervention activities to simple success stories. Much work has been done since 2003 in developing mechanisms and tools for measuring the success of interventions, yet there is little understanding of the reasons behind such developments, and perhaps worse, few applicable *field-ready* tools for practitioners to measure their impact on people within complex systems.

Fourth, the book presents a series of policy options as a way to verify our collective successes in a globalized and inclusive international tradespace through the strategic exercise of measuring effectiveness normed against organizational requirements *and* the priorities of war-affected citizens in post-conflict societies.

This book is not about metrics, indicators, benchmarks, or measures; nor does it delve into the scientific theories of analysis best suited to capture information in the field. It develops a discourse constructed from practitioner perspectives rather than offering a rigorous canvassing of scholarly opinion in this area of inquiry. The aim was to canvas those *working in* peace operations and crisis management rather than those *studying* these operations.

The international community has become preoccupied with measuring the effectiveness of its activities in war-affected environments.[25] This focus is partially motivated by a need to calculate the costs of these very expensive ventures; often activities have not been as successful as intended. Some stakeholders are interested in measuring the effectiveness of their work in places like Afghanistan; those stakeholders who witness the realities in the field are compelled to make the goals, plans, and systems of interventions more effective. Other stakeholders may be reticent to discover whether their military, policing, diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian activities are ineffectual – or worse, whether they have negative effects on citizens recovering from armed conflicts and other calamities.

The problem of measuring success is not a failure of poor indicators or metrics – as yeoman's work continues to be done on this front by organizations like USIP, UN, OECD-DAC, and NATO – but is partially caused by the worldview held by many working in the international system that there is an answer "out there" to explain what is going on in interventions. The answer, it is perennially believed, once found, will allow us to solve the problems of an insecure world.[26] This linear worldview may become an insurmountable obstacle towards relevant intervention policies and approaches and the further maturation of a common tradespace in which progress can be charted. An emerging epistemic community grapples with these difficult questions and contributes to the maturation of the shared processes and policies that connect the sectors in international interventions, confronting territoriality and allowing for increased trade-offs between sectors.

There is no right or best approach to intervention, and therefore no right approach to measuring success. To commit to one way, or a best way, undermines the validity of stakeholder approaches to alleviate the effects of war, and undermines making progress towards tenable peace. The *right metrics* or the *right way to measure* are not "out there" waiting to be discovered by military planners or humanitarian evaluators. There are only better ways to think, and this is what matters in measuring peace operations and civilian crisis management.

Measuring what matters – our *worldviews* – informs our approaches, our policies, and the operational environment. While my friend Mike Pryce would say "military *planning* becomes a way of thinking," I contend that "understanding *thinking* becomes a way of planning" (therefore, measuring). The new complex environment seeks our understanding and a quantum leap of faith – not our metrics – to generate the urgent forward momentum required to measure sustainable results. Leadership may be invaluable in shedding outdated thinking and assuming new thinking appropriate to the complex environment. Only by understanding our worldviews and concomitant failures and successes will we be able to swiftly adopt the necessary sea change required in the race to strengthen weakened states, prevent bloodier violence, and promote tenable peace in our interconnected, complex world.

Then, and only then, will the international community have come of age.

Notes

[1] As a reader, you are invited into this ambiguous tradespace, where there may be more questions than answers and more challenges than solutions. However, this book is a guide to navigating the interconnected tradespace in a way that is meaningful to measuring the interventions that occur there.

[2] Dana Eyre, personal communication during the Civilian Crisis Management Initiatives 2007 Annual Conference, Brussels, Belgium.

[3] Charles T. Call also makes this point: "The burgeoning peacekeeping and peacebuilding industries cost billions of dollars each year, mostly in places where wars have ended but sustainable peace remains questionable" ("Knowing Peace When You See It," 174). The application of business language to the peace sector remains unacceptable to some stakeholders. Considering local recipients of intervention activities as *clients*, basing intervention decisions on *market demand*, and building *business cases* and *business plans* to encourage donors to support humanitarian projects have all been considered as fouling the often morally driven work undertaken for the betterment of humanity. However, as the 1990s ended and the twenty-first century began, it became clear that humanitarianism, development, peacekeeping, peace-building, and crisis management had indeed become *industries* generating their own economies. Governments began assessing their own international development programs through auditing and management tools; peacekeeping operations became influenced by monitoring and evaluation modalities; and humanitarian interventions were measured against performance indicators.

[4] Often, success and progress are used interchangeably in theory and field practice. As progress is inexorably considered as a *positive* rather than a *negative* progress, it is synonymous with *success*, which is commonly conceived of as the progressive realization of a worthy goal.

[5] Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (2006).

[6] Anonymous personal communication, 2008.

[7] Bonventre, "Monitoring and Evaluation," 72.

[8] I have been researching this topic since 2005. My firm was contracted by the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group to develop a *measures of effectiveness system* for the Canadian provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) conducting reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The focus of the project was to develop a progress measurement framework for the 3D approach to reconstruction operations. The project included a network-centric command and control system with effects-based operations logic applicable to reconstruction efforts. To date there are no strategic guidelines in use for PRTs, and each participating nation uses this peace operations mechanism differently. Consequently, PRTs are ad hoc and experimental because they do not have clearly defined objectives and performance measures that assist in determining their accomplishments. See Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (OSIGIR), *Review of Effectiveness*, ix. Militaries are now doing humanitarian and development work through PRTs and often refer to their short-term projects as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Based on experience in Iraq, the US Army has even developed the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is a fund that permits military leadership to conduct pseudo-development projects in the field as it sees fit. According to experts, the use of CERP has caused capacity-building problems across Iraq, enabling the US military to perform tasks that properly belong to local and provincial governments (ibid., ix). According to the interview participant at the UNDPKO, militaries are very good at QIPs, but as soon as NATO leaves Afghanistan, QIP projects will stop, allowing other power-brokers such as the Taliban to fill the void. Comparatively, OCHA is committed to long-term development and is not supportive of military PRTs and QIPs. The development sector thinks of the PRT approach to peace and security as informed by daily needs and short-term thinking (anonymous communication, 2008). A report released by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction supports this perspective, recommending that PRTs should have clearly defined objectives and performance measures and clearly defined milestones for achieving these objectives, should link ways and means, and identify accountability frameworks (OSIGIR, *Review of Effectiveness*, x). The debate about the efficacy of peace and stability created through PRTs is ongoing.

[9] Barton et al., *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*.

[10] Department for International Development (DFID), *Interim Strategy for Afghanistan*.

[11] ALNAP, *Evaluating Humanitarian Action*, 3.

[12] Cordesman, "Missing Metrics," 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Banerjee, "Development for Afghans," 6.

[15] Pawson and Tilley, *Realistic Evaluation*.

[16] Keeney, *Value-Focused Thinking*, 22.

[17] Steve Flemming, personal communication, 2008.

[18] Sawhill and Williamson, "Measuring," 1; also Meharg, *Helping Hands*, 129.

[19] Meharg, *Helping Hands*, 126.

[20] James Embrey, personal communication, 2008.

[21] Sawhill and Williamson, "Measuring," 1.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Jones et al., *Establishing Law and Order.*

[24] United States Government Accountability Office (USGOA), *Afghanistan Reconstruction.*

[25] The following examples highlight this point from a Canadian perspective. In September 2007, Canadian General Ray Henault hosted the NATO Military Committee Conference. The conference provided an opportunity to exchange ideas on sustaining and improving NATO's high readiness forces as well as developing better criteria to measure progress and effectiveness for operations, including Afghanistan. The conference examined strategic aspects of NATO operations and capabilities from a long-term perspective. In October 2007 Canada's Defence Minister Peter MacKay announced that Canada's commitment to NATO required the development of better criteria to measure progress and effectiveness for operations, especially in Afghanistan. The point was echoed in the Government of Canada's Manley Report on Afghanistan (2008), which suggested that to achieve success in theatre, the Canadian government needed to elevate coordination in Ottawa among Canadian departments and agencies engaged in Afghanistan for better efficiency and effectiveness. On 4 February 2008 the appointment of the Canadian commander to NATOs RC-S in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Major General Marc Lessard, was announced. Lessard suggested that his priorities would be coordinating or harmonizing operational aspects of governance and development within the overall security framework. And on 29 February 2008, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer maintained that continued discussions must be held on the effectiveness of the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan and what is needed to achieve success for NATO and the international community as a whole. Interestingly, these examples are representative of the international community's seizure upon this critical topic of the twenty-first century.

[26] A modification of David Hawkins's reference to the perennial quest for *the* answer, from *Power vs. Force,* 25.